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In the Critique ofJudgement, Kant isolates aesthetics as an autono
mous field of human experience and philosophical study by charac
terizing the aesthetic judgement of the beautiful as a synthetic
judgement based on no determinate concept and yet laying claim to
a priori universal validity. Explicating the obligatory force of this
judgement"of taste," he refers to the judgement as "demanding,
requiring, exacting," and ,I imputing" agreement. In Beauty Restored,
Mothersill criticizes this imperative language as a misdirected at
tempt to distinguish judgements of the beautiful from ordinary
empirical judgements.
Characterizing aesthetic judgements as "commands" is, she
says, theoretically unattractive and untrue to phenomenological
reflection. In particular, this peremptory view of the judgement of
taste is inconsistent with the commonplace request for reasons in
support of a judgement and denies the possibility of tentative judge
ments of taste. She argues that aesthetic judgements of the beautiful
are most aptly construed, not as "implicit commands/' but as asser
tions concerning a genuine property of the object in question. I will
argu,e that: (1) Kant's use of imperative language to describe the
judgement of taste is an emphasis on the universal validity of the
judgement as opposed to the merely personal validity of the judge
ment of sense and is not primarily a distinction between the judge
ment of taste and the ordinary empirical judgement. (2) Mothersill's
characterization of the Kantian judgement of taste as a command"
is a misleading dramatization of the normative force of the aesthetic
judgement which informs her therefore misplaced phenomenologi
cal objections to Kant's text. (3) The primary distinction between the
aesthetic judgement and the empirical judgement is not the extraor
dinary normative dimension of the former but that, because the
judgement of taste is not based on determinate concepts, there exist
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no secure procedures for confirming the tru th of a judgement of taste.
Because of this inherent difficulty, judgements of taste solicit agree
ment and offer themselves as examples of potentially genuine judge
mentsi the uncertainty of aesthetic confirmation necessitates the
existence of aesthetic dialogue. (4) The Kantian portrait of the
judgement of taste as soliciting agreement to a universally valid
claim not only allows but depends on the request for reasons and the
possibility of tentative aesthetic judgements.
Summary of the Deduction of the Judgement of Taste. Kant distin
guishes the aesthetic judgement of sense from the aesthetic judge
ment of taste. The former may be infl uenced by personal interest and
emotion and declares an object to be agreeable, while the latter is free
of these impure influences and declares an object to be beautiful. In
contrast with cognitive judgements, whether theoretical or practical,
the aesthetic judgementof taste is not based on a determinate concept
of the object of judgement. With this preliminary characterization,
Kant deduces, as he did in the first two Critiques for theoretical and
practical judgements, a principle grounding the universal validity of
the genuine judgement of taste. Because the judgement of taste is
based on neither personal interest nor a concept of the object, it has
reference only to the mere form of the object, what Kant calls the
"subjective purposiveness of the presentation of the object". Because
it is a formal judgement, the judgement of taste is located in the free
play of the cognitive facul ties of the imagina tion and understanding;
the obscure notion of free play records, among other properties, that
aesthetic presentations engage the cognitive faculties without being
restricted by any particular rule of cognition. These cognitive
faculties of imagination and understanding may be presupposed in
everyone, and moreover presumed the same in everyone, because
they are the basis for the communicability of all cognition. Therefore,
the pure aesthetic judgement of taste, depending only on these
communicable cognitive faculties, is universally communicable and
lays claim to universal validity. Now to defend (1}-(4).
(1) That the judgement of taste and the ordinary empirical judgement
are alike in demanding" and "requiring" agreement. Consider an
ordinary empirical judgement: upon consideration, I announce that
there is a telephone pole standing between us. You reply that it is
rather a tree. I glance up to confirm my judgement and, confirmed,
conclude that you have failed to consider the scene carefully or your
eyesight is poor or you don't know what a "telephone pole" is or else
/I
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are teasing me. I am confident my judgement is true. Would I say
that you should judge in agreement with me? There is no reason you
need judge at all, but if you undertake to judge, to assert a fact about
whatis the case, you are under obligation to doso properly. Whether
the obligation is to judge truly or only to take appropriate measures
to ensure that you are qualified to judge (look up, get glasses, buy a
dictionary of roadside attractions), in either case, there are definite
constraints on the conditions of your reply. If you ignore these
obligations, you are not undertaking to judge but are playing a game,
or stretching your vocal cords, or speaking in code.
The aesthetic judgement appears to have a similar normative
structure: when I judge that Ulysses' Gaze is a beautiful film, I am,
according to both Kant and Mothersill, making a claim to truth or
general validity.l You reply that it was ugly (worthless?); I watch it
again and am quite convinced otherwise - I resolve to discuss it with
you, butin the meantime may hypothesize that you fell asleep during
the film or your eyesight is poor or you haven't read the Odyssey or
are trying to upset me. Ought you to judge in agreement with me?
Again, if you undertake to judge, you should do so properly, whether
that means judging truly, or making proper preparations to judge, or
both.
In her chapter "Kant: Three Avoidable Difficulties," Mothersill
acknowledges that the normativity of the two judgements might be
aligned in this way, but she says that Kant's repeated reference to
Ii demand, requirement," and" implicit command" in the judgement
of taste reflect his belief that "the claims of beauty are ... more
peremptory than the claims of fact. 1II2 Consider the full length of a
passage Mothersill quotes in this connection:
I

Hence [a judgement of taste, which involves] this pleasure[,]
is like any empirical judgement because it cannot proclaim
objective necessity or lay claim to a priori validitYi but like any
other empirical judgement, a judgement of taste claims only to
be valid for everyone, and it is always possible for such a
judgement to be valid for everyone despite its intrinsic con
tingency. What is strange and different about a judgement of
taste is only this: that what is to be connected with the
presentation of the object is not an empirical concept but a
feeling of pleasure (hence no concept at all), though, just as if
it were a predicate connected with cognition of the object, this
feeling is nevertheless to be required of everyone. A singular
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empirical judgement, e.g., the judgement made by someone
who perceives a mobile drop of water in arock crystal, rightly
demands that anyone else must concur with its finding, be
cause the judgement was made in accordance with the uni
versal conditions of the determinative power of judgement
under the laws of a possible experience in general. In the same
way, someone who feels pleasure in the mere reflection on the
form of an object, without any concern about a concept,
rightly lays claim to everyone's assent, even though this judge
ment is empirical and a singular judgement.3 [emphasis
added]
Kant emphasizes that the judgement of taste has, despite its
intrinsic subjectivity, a claim to universal validity; in doing so, he
repeatedly stresses the similarity between the normative structure of
the judgement of taste and the ordinary empirical judgement. He
repeatedly applies the same imperative language of claiming",
demanding", and requiring" to both types of judgement. Presum
ably Kant does not believe the ordinary empirical judgement is
particularly "peremptory" in its claim to general validity; therefore
his description of the" demand" and "requirement" implicit in the
judgement of taste is not meant to highlight an especially strong
normative dimension to that judgement. Throughout the Critique
Kant's use of imperative language contrasts the judgement of taste
with the judgement of sense by emphasizing the universal validity of
the former, and is not meant primarily to distinguish judgements of
taste from ordinary empirical judgements. For example:
II

/I
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In making a judgement of taste (about the beautiful) we
require everyone to like the object, yet without this liking's
being based on a concept ... and that this claim to universal
validity belongs so essentially to a judgement by which we
declare something to be beautiful that it would not occur to
anyone to use this term without thinking of universal valid
ity; instead, everyth.ing we like without a concept would then be
included with the agreeable. 4 [emphasis added]

For although the principle [grounding the judgement of
taste] is only subjective, it would still be assumed as subjec
tively universal (an idea necessary for everyone); and so it
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could, like an objective principle, demand universal assent...5
[emphasis added]
The frequency and strengthofKant' s imperative language records
his consciousness of the counter-intuitive nature of deducing the
universal validity of a subjective, non-conceptual judgement. Let us
proceed directly to the most extreme imperatives which Mothersill
takes as evidence for Kant's" peremptory" stance.
(2) ThatMothersill's characterization ofthe Kantian judgemen t oftaste
as a "command" is misleading; that her phenomenological objections are
misplaced. Mothersill suggests that Kant focuses on the "demand"
and "requirement" implicit in the judgement of taste in order to
distinguish it from a mere fact or assertion:
It is, in other words, the normative aspect of the judgement of
taste that is not captured by the analysis that would entitle us
to say that at least some judgements of taste are' true'. And
it is with a view to supplying the lack that Kant says that in
judging something beautiful, I'exact' (or demand orrequire)
that everyone else find the object a cause of pleasure.6

Why Kant does not permit the application of the predicate true"
to judgements of taste is a topic for careful consideration, but
whatever the eventual answer, his imperative characteriza tion of the
judgement of taste is not undertaken in an attempt to supply any
extTaordinary normative dimension that might not be captured by a
more conservative description. As suggested in section (1), the
demand" and "requirement" emphasize the universal validity of
the judgement of taste, and confirm the status of the aesthetic
judgement alongside other forms of general assertion.
Mothersill proceeds with her discussion of Kant's supposedly
peremptory concerns by quoting from the"General Comment on the
Exposition of the Reflective Aesthetic Judgement"; to my knowledge
this is the only passage of Kane s that she quotes containing the word
"command", and moreover this is the only passage of which I am
aware in the entire first division of the Critique in which"command"
is used in association with the judgement of taste; in particular I do
not find the word in the Analytic of the Beautiful or in the Deduction
of Pure Aesthetic Judgements:
II

II
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We can never arrive at such a principle [to ground the
judgement of taste] by scouting about for empirical laws
about mental changes. For these reveal only how we dci
judge; they do not give us a command as to how we ought to
judge, let alone an unconditioned one. And yet judgements
of taste presuppose such a command, because they insist that
our liking becormected directly with a presentation?
It is a striking miSinterpretation to presume from this passage
that judgements of taste are commands or imply commands. "Com
mand" is here used as a substitute for "principle"; the focus of the
passage is Kant's argument that empirical studies of our taste can
never ground an unconditioned principle which would serve as a
basis for the universal validity of the judgement of taste. Universal
validity is a logical feature of the judgement of taste and therefore the
judgement of taste presupposes such a principle as a condition of
existence; without it, all aesthetic judgements would be mere judge
ments of sense. Because there is no explicit evidence that Kant views
the judgement of taste as a command per se, I presume Mothersill
reads the Kantian 1/ demand" or requirement" as synonymous with
an implicit "command" and that this association informs her phe
nomenological objections to Kant's position. s
Mothersill' s primary criticism of Kant's discussion depends on a
dictatorial interpretation of the obligation implicit in the judgement
of taste:
II

I spoke earlier about the difficulties of making sense of the
command, "Be pleased by 0." Some of these are mitigated
if the thought is recast in the third person as "Let everyone be
pleased by 0," or "Everyone ought to be pleased by 0." We
might then imagine Kant as holding that just as the judge
mentof taste (speech act) implicates 110 pleases me", soitalso
implicates "Everyone ought to be pleased by 0." But is this
the case? The only test is to appeal to reflective conscious
ness, and though the former claim passes the test, the latter (it
seems to me) does not. In putting forth my primary judge
ment, I make a claim on behalf of the object, a claim to the
effectthatit has a special sort of power. But! do not recognize
the intention to issue an order or afiat, nor is a concern with
what other people ought to think a conscious (still less a
dominant) element of what I mean to convey.9
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However close Kant's" claim to general validity" is to Mothersill' s
interpreted "implicit command," it is unquestionably not a "Hat"
and nowhere does Kant suggest that the" dominant" element of a
judgement of taste is a "concern with what other people ought to
think." The claim is a logical feature of the judgement and is, if
anything, prior to intentional meaning.
Nevertheless, Mothersill's characterization of the statements "Be
pleased by 0" and "Let everyone be pleased by 0" as odd and
unnatural is accurate. In this connection she quotes Kant, from
Section 38, saying "we must be entitled to require this pleasure from
everyone." But her focus on pleasure is an artifact of another confu
sion: near the beginning of the Critique, in Section 9, Kant indicates
that the pleasure resulting from a beautiful object follows the judge
ment of taste as its consequence: lilt must be the universal communi
cability of the mental state, in the given presentation, which under
lies the judgement of taste as its subjective condition, and the
pleasure in the object mustbe its consequence." 10 Thus, by Section 38,
when Kant speaks of "requir[ing] pleasure from everyone," he is
substituting a consequentin place of the direct requirement: Irequire
that everyone assent to my judgement and thereby experience the
associated pleasure. Kant footnotes this line, which is the only line
in the section referring to pleasure, with the immediate clarification
that the phrase "require this pleasure" refers to "laying claim to
universal assent to a judgement of the aesthetic power of judge
ment. flll In short, objecting to the Kantian judgement of taste as
implying the questionable imperatives "Be pleased by 0" and "Let
everyone be pleased by 0" is a mistake. Even were we to accept that
Kant's judgement of taste entails a strong implicit command, the
statements "Judge in accord with pit or "Let everyone judge pI! are
neither odd nor unnatural, but quite common.

(3) That the judgement of taste is different from the ordinary empirical
judgement, not in its imperative claim to universal validity, but in having
no determinate testing procedures; explication ofthe exentplm' model. We
have focused on the similarities Kant establishes between the norma
tive structure of the genuine judgement of taste and the ordinary
empirical judgement. But the aesthetic judgement is not based on a
determinate concept of the object of judgement, as is the ordinary
empirical judgement, and this imposes a strong condition on the
proper application of the power of aesthetic judgement. 1£, uninten
tionally, I issue an aesthetic judgement based on a concept of the
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object, I may have given a practical or theoretical judgement or
uttered a judgement of sense, but! will nothave succeeded in making
a genuine judgement of taste. Kant describes other hazards which
may befall a judgement of the beautiful: if it is tainted by personal
interest, or is based in an emotional response or in the mere"charms"
of the object, the abortive judgement of taste will become a judge
ment of sense or a practical judgement. If these various conditions of
felicity are met, the power of aesthetic judgement is properly em
ployed and the resulting judgement will be universally valid. In this
case, Kant says, the judgement has been correctly subsumed under
the principle of subjective universal validity" .
If the aesthetic judgement was based on a determinate concept,
there would exist rules or procedures, given by the concept, for
determining whether the power of judgement has been properly
employed. For example, if I praise this painting of a woodpecker
because the woodpecker painting market is on the rise, which Kant
calls judging according to the concept of utility, you could determine
whether the woodpecker painting market is, in fact, on the rise, and
whether this is, in fact, a painting of a woodpecker and thus worthy
of my accolade; alternately, were I to praise the painting because it is
an excellent representation of a woodpecker, which Kant calls judg
ing according to the concept of perfection, you could conjure a
woodpecker and compare ("But woodpeckers don't have green
feet!"). Ordinary empirical judgements are based on concepts of the
objects involved; therefore, when I judge that there is a raven in the
belfry, you may go up to the belfry and trap all the birds and see
whether any of them match the concept "raven." Kant's judgement
of taste is never based on a determinate concept, and therefore no
such procedure exists for aesthetic judgements. That the difficulty of
confirming the proper application of the power of aesthetic judge
ment in no way undermines the universal validity of the genuine
judgement, Kant indicates in numerous passages:
1/

Beauty is not a concept of an object, and a judgement of taste
is not a cognitive judgement. All it asserts is that we are
justified in presupposing universally in all people the same
subjective conditions of the power of judgement that we find
in ourselves; apart from this it asserts only that we have
subsumed the given object correctly under these conditions.
It is true that this latter assertion involves unavoidable dif£i
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culties that do not attach to the logical power of the judge
ment (since there we subsume under concepts, whereas in
the aesthetic power of judgement we subsume under a rela
tion of the imagination and understanding, as they harmo
nize with each other in the presented from of an object, that
can only be sensed, so that the subsumption may easily be
illusory) .... For as far as the difficulty and doubt concerning
the correctness of the subsumption under that principle is
concerned, no more doubt is cast on the legitimacy of the
claim that aesthetic judgements as such have this validity
(and hence is cast on the principle itself), than is cast on the
principle of the logical power of judgement (a principle that
is objective) by the fact that [sometimes] (though not so often
and so easily) this power's subsumption under its principle
is faulty as well. 12
If this difficulty of confirmation is extreme, if we can find no
method for confirming aesthetic judgements, how is the lengthy
deduction which determined the universal validity of genuinejudge
ments other than otiose?
Thoughhe does not describe the connection explicitly, Kant hints
that aesthetic discussion provides a method for confirmation of
judgements of taste in the absence of explicit testing procedures, and
in his Aesthetic Problems of Modern. Philosophy," Cavell elabo
rates this possibility. Consider two passages in which Kant mentions
the difficulty of aesthetic verification:
/I

Hence the ought in an aesthetic judgement, even once we
have all the data needed for judging, is still uttered only
conditionally. We solicit everyone else's assent because we
have a basis for it that is common to all. Indeed, we could
count on that assent, if only we could always be sure that the
instance had been subsumed correctly under that basis,
which is the rule for theapprovalP [emphasis added]

Whenever we make a judgement declaring something to be
beautiful, we permit no one to hold a different opinion, even
though we base our judgement only on our feeling rather
than on concepts; hence we regard this underlying feeling as
a common rather than as a private feeling. ... Hence the
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commonsense, of whose judgement I am at that point offering
my judgement oftaste as an example, attributing to it exemplary
validity on that account, is a mere ideal standard .... [this
judgement] could, like an objective principle, demand uni
versal assent insofar as agreement among different judging
persons is concerned, provided only we ,,,ere certain that we
had subsumed under it correctly.14 [emphasis added]
Because I am never certain of the proper application of my own
power of aesthetic judgement, when making judgements of taste I
"solidt" agreement from all others and offer" my judgement"as an
example" of the common, genuine judgement. As Cavell says, in
making an aesthetic judgement, 1 tum to the other "not to convince
him without proof but to get him to prove something, test something,
against himself. [1 am] saying: Look and find out whether you can see
what I see, wish to say what I wish to say."1S If together, in aesthetic
dialogue we can find a judgement in common, an understanding we
can agree upon, we assert it as valid and hold to it until another
person comes to question us or until we decide to question one
another again. Thus, we might saYI dialectic is the main instrument
for the acquisition of aesthetic knowledge; because of the conditional
inherent in the judgement of taste, the other holds a hallowed place
in our aesthetic lives.
(4) That the Kantian model ofaesthetic judgement as soliciting ~gree
ment to a universally valid claim admits the request for reasons and
tentative judgements. Mothersill motivates the supposed Kantian
command by saying, liThe advantage (it might seem) of a command
is that provided you have the requisite authority, the request for
reasonsisoutoforder" (16). Immediatelyfollowingthis,shecounters,
as a matter of fact, the request for reasons is not out of order." As we
have seen, Kant's judgement of taste lays claim to general validity
only on the implicit condition that it is genuine, and the confirmation
of that condition is always uncertain. There is ample room in the
process of confirmation for the request for reasons and, in factI the
process depends on that request. The "requirement" of agreement
which appears to threaten this openness to questioning is a logical
feature of the judgement, as the claim to universal validity is a logical
feature of an ordinary empirical judgement. When I assert that there
is a owl in the bam, I expect you to agree, but that never precludes
you asking how it is 1 know.
1/

l
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Mothersill raises a related objection concerning the categoricality
of the judgement of taste, namely, that Kant's judgement of taste
could not be tentative. She says:
The security I feel in those of my primary judgements which
cluster at one end of a spectrum .,. Kant wants to construe as
a logical feature of the judgement of taste itself. It is as if no
one ever made a tentative appraisal or was ever persuaded
that he had made a mistake. An opinion can be venrured,
floated for discussion, modified over time, revised, aban
doned, but it is not clear, nor does Kant explain how such
modalities are construed on the view that makes the judg
ment of taste a 'command' which is 'unconditioned' and
which extracts a 'necessary universal delight' P
Another conflict born of her reading of Kant: that a judgement of
taste lays claim to universal validity is a logical feature of the
judgement and is the condition of the existence of such judgements.
Without it, they would be mere judgements of sense. Mothersill
would be the first to agree that when I venture that a film is good, I
am being tentative about the accuracy of the claim, butnotin the least
about the categorical implications of the judgement if true. If con
firmed, my judgement is, as Mothersill would put it, a claim that the
object itself has a power that is valid for everyone. Ordinary
empirical judgements again provide a model. When I say, flI suspect
there is a grouse in the pantry," I await confirrnationor disconfirmation
of my claim ("Get a flashlight!"), but all the while the claim concerns
a grouse in the pantry for me and for you and for anyone else who cares
to look.
When Mothersill reconsiders Kant's Critique in Chapter XI, she
acknowledges more explicitly that Kant is aware of the contingencies
inherent in the power of aesthetic judgement and she refers to a
number of the passages quoted above that indicate Kant's position is
not so far removed from her own. She says, "I argued earlier that if
Kant were willing (as he sometimes seems to be) to weaken the
notion of what we'demand' of everyone and allow that the'ought'
of the judgement of taste is to be construed as a subjunctive, he would
have come very close to the truth." 1S The extent of the difference
between Kant's position, as it stands, and Mothersill's revision is, as
I hope I have shown, a matter for more careful consideration;
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perhaps Kant's emphasis on the"demand" implicit in the judgement
of taste is not intended with the dictatorial force Mothersill reads in
it. Nevertheless, Mothersill reiterates a remaining objection to Kant's
characterization of the conditions on the truth of the judgement of
taste:
My quarrel with Kant, as suggested earlier, is that he presents
a conceptual daim in such a way as to suggest that the task of
a critic, that is, someone who wants to communicate, test, and
consolidate his findings, is largely introspective ",19
She goes on to say, with reference to her imagined perplexity at
finding a brush-and-ink scroll beautiful, " An investigation (if I care
to undertake one) will focus not on my inner life but ort the scroll I see
before me."20 Kant's conditions on the proper application of the
power of aesthetic judgement, namely that the judgement is made
without a determinate concept and without reference to personal
interest or emotion, are internal conditions. This characterization of
the contingency in the judgement of taste appears to conflict with the
phenomenological fact that we resolve doubts concerning the truth
of aesthetic judgements by attention not to our mental or emotional
state but to the object in question - confirmation is an external
process,
Aesthetic dialogue can, through mutual external scrutiny, con
firm and facilitate the satisfaction of the internal conditions for
genuine judgement. Consider an extreme example of aesthetic
disagreement: I attest that my friend's novel is one of the best of the
year, you respond that it is trash. Your denial of my judgement alone
may be sufficient for me to reconsider; I reread the novel and
discover that it is, in fact, trash - perhaps it occurs to me that my
earlier judgement was biased, perhaps not; in either case, I have
arrived at an unbiased, disinterested judgement through confronta
tion with the judgement of another. Or again: you rave about The
Brothers Karamazov, but your extended discussion of the intricacies
and subtleties of Ivan's character leave me bewildered; I realize how
strongly I identified with Alyosha and recognize that my love of the
novel bears, not reconsideration, but refOCUSing. We are each prone
to a different set of aesthetic failures; the variety of favorite subjects,
personal biases, and emotional responses ensures that in confronting
another over an aesthetic judgement, I will have my prejudices and
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confusions challenged, perhaps by other prejudices and equal confu
sions but nevertheless in a mode which, if I am open to it, may move
me toward a more honest evaluation of the work in question.

NOTES

1. It is worth noting that our paradigmatic examples of ordinary empirical
judgements are specific statements, while examples of aesthetic judgements tend
to be generic. Does this suggest that our aesthetic vocabulary is impoverished or
that our real aesthetic judgements are embarrassing or betray a fantasy or
confusion of our theoretical model~or does it reflect an inherent difference in the
structure of the two judgements?
2. Mary Mothersill, Beauty Restored. p. 215.
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar ak.191. All
quotations are from Pluhar's translation. All section references are to the
Akademie edition.
4. ibid., 215.
5. ibid., 239. I will not defend this point further. See section 6.211~2, s.7 entire,

s.8.214, s.18.236, and s.20 entire. That Kant's imperative language distinguishes
the judgement of taste from the judgement of sense and not from the ordinary
empirical judgement is also evidenced in the quotations given in section (3)
below.
6. Mothel'sill, p. 214.
7. Kant, 278.
8. In any discussion where distinctions tum on apparent subtleties of word
choice, we must be wary of confusions and artifacts of translation. For the
purpose of this discussion, I can only take Pluhar's translation on faith; he does,
however, specifically attest to the accuracy of rendering ansinnen and zumetel1 as
"require" in footnote 26, p. 57. We may hope his other choices are as true to the
original.
9. Mothersill, p. 215.
10. Kant, 217.
11. ibid., 290.
12. ibid., 290~1.

13. ibid., 237.
14. ibid., 239.
15. Stanley Cavell/ /I Aesthetic Problems in Modem Philosophy" in Must We Mean
What We Say?, p. 95-6.
16. Mothersill, p. 217.
17. ibid., 162.
18. ibid., 328.
19. ibid., 329.
20. ibid., 330.
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